

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 2565

.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOL, NATO
SUBJECT: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1977: DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED
VERSION

REF: USNATO 2494 (DTG 281806Z APR 77)

THERE FOLLOWS BELOW THE DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF
MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1977 (DRC/N(77)15), WHICH REFLECTS
DEFENSE REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DISCUSSION APRIL 29
(SEPTEL) OF AN INFORMAL DRAFT (REFTEL). DRC WILL ADDRESS
THE REVISED DRAFT ON MAY 6. IF WASHINGTON HAS ANY COM-
MENTS, WE WILL NEED THEM BY OPENING OF BUSINESS MAY 6.
WE WILL PROVIDE OUR COMMENT SEPTEL. BEGIN TEXT OF
DRC/N(77)15:

MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE - 1977

DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED VERSION

NATO OBJECTIVES

1. THE OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO IS TO PRESERVE
PEACE AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH AT-
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LANTIC TREATY AREA PRIMARILY BY A CREDIBLE DETERRENCE
EFFECTED BY CONFRONTING ANY POSSIBLE THREATENED OR ACTUAL
AGGRESSION WITH ADEQUATE NATO FORCES, WITHIN THE CONCEPT
OF FORWARD DEFENSE AND FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE.

2. IN PURSUIT OF ITS OBJECTIVES OF DETERRENCE, DEFENSE
AND DETENTE, THE ALLIANCE IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN DIS-
CUSSIONS WITH THE EAST ON CERTAIN BROAD ISSUES OF SECURITY.
HOWEVER, ANY EVENTUAL CHANGE IN TERMS OF MILITARY SECURITY
STILL REMAINS TO BE IDENTIFIED.

THE LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT

3. THE 1975 MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE, THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF WHICH REMAIN SUBSTANTIALLY VALID, INCORPORATED A LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT. THE ESSENCE OF THIS CONCEPT IS THAT NATO CAN ATTAIN AND MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE FORCE STRUCTURE FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IF NATIONS WORK TOGETHER EFFICIENTLY, IF THE ALLIES CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE LEVELS OF DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS AND IF NATO AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES SET AND APPLY RIGOROUS PRIORITIES. A MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF THE CONCEPT, LOOKING TO THE LONGER TERM, IS TO ESTABLISH A MORE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENSE PLANNING.

4. THE LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED MORE VIGOROUSLY IN THE COMING PLANNING PERIOD; IN SO DOING IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ADVERSE TRENDS IN THE MILITARY BALANCE WHICH HAVE EMERGED IN RECENT YEARS.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

5. THE STEADY EXPANSION OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY CAPABILITIES HAS GREATLY INCREASED THE POWER AND FLEXIBILITY OF WARSAW PACT FORCES. THESE FORCES ARE INCREASINGLY OFFENSIVE IN POSTURE AND NOW CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE SOVIET UNION'S POLITICAL INTERESTS ON A GLOBAL SCALE.

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SIVE IN POSTURE AND NOW CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE SOVIET UNION'S POLITICAL INTERESTS ON A GLOBAL SCALE.

6. THE STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUE TO IMPROVE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF NEW NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS, INCLUDING THE EXPECTED DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20 MOBILE INTERMEDIATE RANGE SYSTEM CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND BEYOND. IT IS IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD, HOWEVER, WHERE THE GROWTH OF THE WARSAW PACT CAPABILITY HAS BEEN MOST PRONOUNCED. IN PARTICULAR, THE WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO STAGE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN EUROPE WITHOUT REINFORCEMENT, USING INITIALLY FORCES WHICH ARE IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS AND DEPLOYED CLOSE TO NATO BORDERS; AND TO EXPLOIT ANY INITIAL SUCCESS WITH ADDITIONAL READY FORCES. THE IMPROVED CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT TACTICAL AIR FORCES, AND THE INCREASING AMOUNT OF THOSE FORCES WHICH COULD BE USED FOR OFFENSIVE AND DEEP PENETRATION OPERATIONS, NOW PERMIT THE WARSAW PACT TO CONDUCT THE INITIAL STAGES OF AN AIR ATTACK TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN HITHERTO WITH IN-PLACE FORCES. THE SOVIET UNION CAN NOW EXERCISE SEA POWER ON A GLOBAL SCALE. THIS FOLLOWS THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW AND IMPROVED SHIPS, SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT; MARKED

IMPROVEMENTS IN WEAPONS AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, OPERATING STANDARDS AND LOGISTIC POSTURE; AND ACCESS TO OVERSEAS SHORE SUPPORT FACILITIES AND AIRFIELDS.

7. THE STEADY GROWTH IN MILITARY POWER IS BACKED IN THE SOVIET UNION BY AN ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR DEFENSE ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN 11 PERCENT TO 13 PER CENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (NEARLY 3 TIMES THE NATO AVERAGE) AND BY AN ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL TERMS IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURE OF ABOUT 5 PERCENT. THE HEAVY INVESTMENT BY THE

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SOVIET UNION IN MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT HAS BEGUN TO ERODE THE QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGE IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT LONG ENJOYED BY NATO.

8. ALTHOUGH THE ALLIES ARE UNDERTAKING SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS, MANY DEFICIENCIES REMAIN IN NATO FORCES. THE FORCE GOALS AND COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM ADOPTED IN 1976 IN THE LIGHT OF THE 1975 GUIDANCE REPRESENTED MINIMUM OBJECTIVES TO MAINTAIN NATO'S DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN THE LIGHT OF THE THREAT AS ASSESSED AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, NOT ALL OF THESE OBJECTIVES ARE BEING ACHIEVED BY COUNTRIES.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

9. AS A RESULT OF THE CONTINUING GROWTH IN THE WARSAW PACT'S OFFENSIVE MILITARY POWER AND OF THE MODEST LEVEL OF THE NATO RESPONSE, THE DISPARITY IN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT CONTINUES TO WIDEN. THIS ADVERSE TREND POINTS TO CERTAIN AREAS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN BOTH NATIONAL AND NATO PLANNING.

10. NATO STRATEGY. NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR DETER-
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RENCE AND FORWARD DEFENSE REMAINS VALID. HOWEVER, IF NATO IS TO RETAIN THE ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THIS STRATEGY AND TO AVOID THE NEED TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT AN EARLY STAGE, A BALANCED FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH EMPHASIS PLACED ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS.

11. WARNING OF WAR. FULL ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN OF THE COMPRESSION OF WARNING TIMES RESULTING FROM KNOWN IMPROVEMENTS IN THE WARSAW PACT FORCES, PARTICULARLY CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WHICH HAVE GIVEN THEM AN INCREASED ABILITY TO ATTACK WITH VERY LITTLE PREPARATION. WHILE NATO SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE WARSAW PACT AGGRESSIONS, FROM AN ATTACK BY READY FORCES WITH VERY LITTLE WARNING TO A FULLY REINFORCED ATTACK WITH A SHORT PERIOD OF TENSION, PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO THE FORMER.

12. CRISIS MANAGEMENT. FOR DETERRENCE AS WELL AS DEFENSE NATO NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO TAKE PROMPT POLITICAL DECISIONS IN TIMES OF TENSION, AS WELL AS TO DEPLOY ITS FORCES IN A TIMELY AND ORDERLY FASHION READY FOR WAR. THIS REQUIRES HIGHLY DEVELOPED SYSTEMS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT INCLUDING COMMAND AND CONTROL AND FOR THE DIRECTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND IMPROVED COORDINATION OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN ORDER TO EXERCISE THE MAXIMUM CONTROL IN A DEVELOPING CRISIS.

13. FORCE STANDARDS. FORCES COMMITTED TO NATO IN MANY INSTANCES DO NOT MEET THE STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS; THIS SERIOUS DEFICIENCY IMPAIRS FORCE CAPABILITIES AND SHOULD BE CORRECTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

14. READY FORCES. THE ENHANCED ABILITY OF THE WARSAW PACT TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK AT SHORT NOTICE PLACES ADDITIONAL CONFIDENTIAL

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EMPHASIS ON NATO'S NEED FOR ADEQUATE, FULLY TRAINED AND EXERCISED IN-PLACE FORCES.

15. RESERVE FORCES. ASSIGNED AND EARMARKED RESERVE FORCES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF BEING DEPLOYED RAPIDLY AS ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED AND SUFFICIENTLY TRAINED UNITS IN SUPPORT OF THE STANDING FORCES. SYSTEMS FOR RAPID CALL-UP SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND EXERCISED SO THAT THE MANPOWER NEEDED TO MAKE STANDING FORCES COMBAT READY CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE ON TIME.

16. REINFORCEMENTS. NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT REQUIRES A CAPABILITY FOR RAPID AUGMENTATION OF ITS IN-PLACE FORCES.

REINFORCEMENT AND AUGMENTATION FORCES SHOULD REACH AN AREA
OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT BEFORE AN AGGRESSION TAKES PLACE OR,
IF WARNING TIME IS VERY SHORT, EARLY ENOUGH TO AFFECT THE

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INITIAL COURSE OF HOSTILITIES. SPECIAL EMPHASIS SHOULD
BE PLACED ON PRESTOCKING, ON THE TIMELY PROVISION OF SEA
AND AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES AND ON ADEQUATE RECEPTION FACIL-
ITIES.

17. DEFENSE AGAINST ARMOR. ALTHOUGH THE ALLIANCE HAS
IMPROVED ITS ANTI-ARMOR CAPABILITIES, A GAP PERSISTS
BETWEEN THESE CAPABILITIES AND THE THREAT POSED BY THE
WARSAW PACT'S ARMORED FORCES AND MORE MODERN ANTI-ARMOR
WEAPONS SHOULD BE ACQUIRED.

18. MARITIME. THE UNREMITTING BUILDUP AND MODERNIZATION
OF THE SOVIET NAVY, PERMITTING THE SOVIET UNION TO EXER-
CISE SEA POWER ON A GLOBAL SCALE, CALL FOR THE RATE OF
IMPROVEMENTS OF MARITIME FORCES BY NATO TO BE INCREASED.
THE MARITIME CONTRIBUTION TO THE OVERALL NATO STRATEGY
CONTINUES TO BE A BASIC ELEMENT IN MAINTAINING THE CREDI-
BILITY OF THE DETERRENT.

19. AIR DEFENSE. THE INCREASING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF
WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES EMPHASIZES THE NEED TO IMPROVE
NATO'S AIR DEFENSES OVER LAND AND AT SEA. TO ENHANCE THE
SURVIVABILITY OF NATO FORCES, THE ALLIANCE'S INTEGRATED
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED AND MODERNIZED.
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20. REGIONAL ASPECTS. THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC
AREA IS INDIVISIBLE. ON THE FLANKS AN ADEQUATE ALLOCATION
OF FORCES AND A BALANCED MILITARY EFFORT MUST BE ASSURED;
CONTINUED EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO STRENGTHEN LOCAL MOBIL-
IZATION CAPABILITIES, ADVANCE THE ARRIVAL TIMES OF EXTER-

NAL REINFORCEMENTS AND IMPROVE RECEPTION AND OTHER LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS. FOR SOME COUNTRIES ASSISTANCE FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES IS REQUIRED AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR IMPROVED REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES.

21. NEW TECHNOLOGY. WHILE IT WOULD BE ILLUSIONARY TO BELIEVE THAT MODERN TECHNOLOGY CAN OFFER CHEAP SOLUTIONS, IT CAN PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH, IF UTILIZED IN A TIMELY AND INTEGRATED MANNER, CAN BESTOW SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS ON THE DETERRENT AND DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF NATO.

ALLIANCE COOPERATION

22. NATO RESOURCES ARE NOT BEING EMPLOYED TO THE BEST EFFECT SINCE DEFENSE PROGRAMS ARE ORGANIZED FOR THE MOST PART ON A NATIONAL BASIS, AND THE PREROGATIVES OF SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF FINANCE ARE BOUND TO PLACE LIMITS ON THE PACE AND DEGREE TO WHICH INTEGRATION CAN BE ACHIEVED. SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BUT THERE IS STILL MUCH ROOM FOR A BETTER ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE RESOURCES, ESPECIALLY THROUGH GREATER ALLIANCE COOPERATION. THIS PROCESS WOULD BE GREATLY FACILITATED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MORE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENSE PLANNING INCORPORATING A LONGER TERM APPROACH. ONLY THUS WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A TIMELY AND ORDERLY WAY THE NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS, SET THE PRIORITIES, RECONCILE DEMANDS ON RESOURCES FOR COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WITH THOSE REQUIRED FOR NATIONAL EFFORTS, AND IDENTIFY AREAS FOR COOPERATION.

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ARMAMENTS PLANNING

23. THE COST OF EQUIPMENT TO INCREASE DISPROPORTIONATELY IN RELATION TO MOST OTHER DEFENSE COSTS HAS CONTINUED. IN MANY CASES THE COST OF MAJOR DEFENSE PROJECTS IS BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF MOST MEMBER NATIONS TO FINANCE ALONE. THE COST OF EQUIPMENT IS ALSO OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE FOR POTENTIAL BUYERS AMONG ALLIES BECAUSE OF THE BUDGETARY IMPACT ON THEIR DEFENSE PLANNING. INTERESTED COUNTRIES SHOULD THEREFORE BE INVOLVED IN RELEVANT PROJECTS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. UNCOORDINATED RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF DIFFERENT WEAPON SYSTEMS FOR SIMILAR ROLES HAS LEAD, AND WILL CONTINUE TO LEAD, TO PROBLEMS OF NON-STANDARDIZATION AND THE LACK OF INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN FORCES AND EQUIPMENT OF MEMBER NATIONS.

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24. ONGOING STUDIES SHOULD THEREFORE BE PURSUED WITH A VIEW TO HARMONIZING NATIONAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT PLANNING PROCEDURES AND DEVELOPING NATO LONG-TERM ARMAMENTS PLANNING. LONG-TERM PLANNING TARGETS SHOULD BE BASED ON COMMON THREAT CRITERIA AND AGREED OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS, PHILOSOPHIES AND DOCTRINES. THERE SHOULD BE EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS AND PROJECTS WHICH COMMEND THEMSELVES TO A MULTINATIONAL APPROACH UNDER THE AEGIS OF NATO. THE AIM OF THESE EFFORTS SHOULD BE STANDARDIZATION AND, WHERE THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, FULL INTEROPERABILITY. IN PURSUING THESE OBJECTIVES, AN INCREASE IN TRAFFIC IN THE "TWO-WAY STREET" BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA IN WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT WILL BE NECESSARY.

IMPACT ON NATO PLANNING

26. IN DEVELOPING MORE RATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR NATO'S LONG-TERM PLANNING FOR DEFENSE, NATO CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES, IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, MUST SEEK TO HARMONIZE PLANNING MECHANISMS FOR THE VARIOUS COOPERATIVE AND SUPPORTING PROGRAMS, AND TO DOVE-TAIL THE RESULTS OF THIS EFFORT WITH THE PRESENT NATO FORCE PLANNING PROCEDURES INTO A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH FOR ALLIANCE DEFENSE PLANNING; THE NEED FOR EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF MAJOR COOPERATIVE PROJECTS WILL BE OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. THE ACTIVITIES OF REGIONAL GROUPS, SUCH AS THE EUROGROUP, WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE IN THIS CONTEXT.

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CONCLUSION

27. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES FOR ALLIANCE CO-OPERATION DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION IS ESSENTIAL IF THE FULL POTENTIAL OF AVAILABLE DEFENSE RESOURCES IS TO BE REALIZED.

RESOURCES FOR DEFENSE

28. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ADVERSE TRENDS IN THE NATO-WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE AND IN ORDER TO AVOID A CONTINUED DETERIORATION IN THE RELATIVE FORCE CAPABILITIES, AN ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL TERMS IN DEFENSE BUDGETS SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES. NATIONS SHOULD, MOREOVER, ENDEAVOR TO INCREASE THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, IN PARTICULAR THE PERCENTAGE OF SUCH EXPENDITURE DEVOTED TO MAJOR EQUIPMENT, BUT WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO COMBAT READINESS.

PRIORITIES

29. IN DETERMINING THE ALLOCATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES, PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THOSE CAPABILITIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO DETERRENCE AND TO NATO'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND THE INITIAL PHASES OF ATTACK AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO MEASURES WHICH WILL ENHANCE READINESS, EFFECTIVENESS, SURVIVABILITY, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL; ENABLE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES WHICH CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE EXPECTED WARNING TIME OR EARLY ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN A SUCCESSFUL CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE; AND PROMOTE THE COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO EQUIPPING, SUPPORTING AND TRAINING

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ALLIANCE FORCES. END TEXT. STREATOR

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